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"The various events of the American revolution — the attempt on fort Cumberland — the design 
against Halifax, only set aside by the fear of the epidemic small pox [July 1775], and many other 
obvious causes, created a reign of terror in this province which continued to the close of the war in 
1783." 
— Beamish Murdoch, 1866 
"There is an impression that in Nova Scotia only New Englanders were suspected of disloyalty and 
sympathy with the Revolutionists." 
—Walter C. Murray, 1903 
'"My son, a great rebel hunt is in progress. Every man of New England birth is suspect, and when he 
happens to be a merchant with many in his debt, there are sure to be certain ones eager to denounce him, 
truly or falsely, to bring about his ruin. Halifax is ringing with accusations and denunciations'." 
— Thomas H. Raddall, His Majesty's Yankees, 1942 
IN APRIL 1754 MALACHY SALTER, a 38-year-old émigré Boston merchant, sat on the 
grand jury which discharged a 'foreign Protestant' immigrant lying under an 
indictment of high treason. This was the first attempted prosecution for treason in 
what is now Canada.) Twenty-four years to the month later, Malachy Salter, 
ex-justice of the peace, himself stood indicted for sedition. It was the second 
occasion on which the Halifax grand jury — their heads turned by rebellion and 
civil war in America and insurrection in the Chignecto hinterland — had returned 
'true bill' on an indictment against Salter for ancillary crime against the state. 
"During the American Revolt..." wrote Thomas Beamish Akins in 1895, "Mr. 
Salter, with several other gentlemen of the town, became suspected of treasonable 
correspondence. He was twice under prosecution, but on a full investigation nothing 
appeared to have been said or written by him of sufficient moment to warrant the 
charges".2 Writing almost three decades earlier, the lawyer-chronicler Beamish 
Murdoch — a paternal great-grandson of Salter — adopted a somewhat different 
1 R. v. Hoffman (N.S. Gen. Ct., 1754). See Barry Cahill, "The 'Hoffman Rebellion' (1753) and 
'Hoffman's Trial' (1754): Constructive High Treason and Seditious Conspiracy in Nova Scotia 
under the Stratocracy", in F. Murray Greenwood and Barry Wright, eds., Canadian State Trials 
[Volume One]: Law, Politics and Security Measures, 1608-1837 (Toronto, 1996), pp. 72-97. 
The author is grateful to Jim Phillips, Barry Wright and the three anonymous reviewers at 
Acadiensis for their critiques of earlier drafts of this article. 
2 T.B. Akins, "History of Halifax City", Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 8 (1895), 
p. 235. 
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perspective: the Council, in November 1777, had ordered the arrest, detention and 
prosecution of his ancestor for corresponding with the enemy. Murdoch went on to 
assert, however inaccurately, that Salter was tried and acquitted at the next 
supreme court.3 In fact, the accused, who had already been tried and convicted 
earlier the same year for uttering seditious words, was neither tried for nor acquitted 
of the more serious misdemeanour of treasonable correspondence. Trial was 
indefinitely postponed and the lingering threat of prosecution was removed only by 
Salter's death three years later. Murdoch's brief account bears contrasting with the 
slightly later and more expansive one provided by Salter's great-great-
granddaughter, Susan Stairs: 
On October 10th, 1777, was passed an order-in-council for the arrest of 
Malachy Salter on a charge of corresponding with parties in Boston of a 
dangerous tendency, and a prosecution was ordered. The original 
indictment of the grand jury was found a few years ago in the court house, 
and is now in the possession of the [Nova Scotia] Historical Society. In 
this paper is stated that Malachy Salter is reported to have said, 'He did 
not think the rebels were so far wrong'; but upon this the grand jury 
indicted him for high treason, but Mr. Salter was allowed to give security 
himself in £500, and two others each £250 for his good behaviour. He was 
tried in the supreme court and acquitted.... 
I have seen the indictment and am sorry that I did not copy the names of 
the grand jury.4 
Taking the Salter case as its point of departure, this article provides an account 
of the sedition proceedings arising from the inability or unwillingness of the old 
New England mercantile elite of Halifax to navigate between the shoals of 
neutrality and disloyalty, and thus respond successfully to the challenge posed by 
the government's reaction to the emergency in the New England colonies. The Nova 
Scotia government attempted to suppress sedition in Halifax and elsewhere in the 
colony through a variety of measures, executive and judicial, which involved both 
3 Beamish Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia, or Acadie (Halifax, 1866), vol. 2, pp. 587-8. 
Murdoch failed to mention that Salter had been tried and convicted of uttering seditious words in 
February 1777. The bias of the historiography — and it persists — is to paint Salter as a 'good' 
American; a loyal Yankee rather than a disloyal, or even 'neutral' one. See, for example, C. Bruce 
Fergusson, comp., A Directory of the Members of the Legislative Assembly of Nova Scotia 
1758-1958 (Halifax, 1958), p. 307; and Arthur Wentworth Hamilton Eaton, "Chapters in the 
History of Halifax, Nova Scotia, No. X: Halifax and the American Revolution", Americana 12, 2 
(April 1918), p. 200. 
4 [Anon., comp.], Family History: Stairs Morrow: Including Letters, Diaries, Essays, Poems, Etc. 
(Halifax, 1906), pp. 252-3. Susannah Duffus Morrow [Mrs William James Stairs], 1822-1906, 
began to compose "The Morrow Family" history in 1879. The court document to which she refers is 
no longer to be found in the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society fonds, now held at the Public 
Archives of Nova Scotia [PANS], nor are other records extant of the Halifax grand jury of the time. 
It is nevertheless clear from Mrs Stairs' description of the proceeding that her ancestor Salter was 
charged not with high treason (rebellion) but with sedition (incitement to rebellion). 
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prosecution and persecution, legal repression and legal harassment. The use of the 
formal law in sedition trials was an essential aspect of the official response to the 
American Revolution. For a variety of reasons repression and not leniency marked 
the legal process. Official repression through the criminal justice system was 
distinguished by various methods of harassing suspected rebel sympathizers: arrest, 
imprisonment or detention without trial, oppressive recognizances, delay of trial 
through repeated continuances, pseudo-treason indictments disguised as high 
misdemeanour (serious sedition), and vexatious or malicious reindictment. 
The causes and nature of the official response to sedition in Nova Scotia in the 
era of the American Revolution must be evaluated in the context of the aftermath of 
the patriot siege of Fort Cumberland in 1776.5 In responding to the insurrection, the 
government, soon also facing legal constraints which prohibited trials for high 
treason, turned to the lesser charge of sedition as a means of suppressing dissent. 
Any account of rebellion and repression in the Revolutionary era would be 
incomplete, therefore, if trials for sedition such as Salter's were not placed in the 
broader context of the official reaction to political protest and dissent on the part of 
Nova Scotia's New Englanders. The government's reaction to Salter's articulation 
of his pro-patriot political views was characterized more by repression than by 
leniency, and, in particular, the heavy hand of the law of sedition was imposed. 
Yet Salter was one of only two patriot sympathizers actually tried for sedition, 
and, while both were found guilty, neither received a harsh sentences 
Except for two of the patriot besiegers of Fort Cumberland, no one in Nova 
Scotia was tried for high treason during the period which encompassed the 
American Revolution.7 This article attempts to show why Malachy Salter, an 
'economic republican' who, nevertheless, did not favour American independence 
and who was not himself a rebel, was subjected to such an extreme degree of 
harassment and continuing legal repression. It also suggests that the only reason 
why Salter was not charged with high treason was that the imperial Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act of 1777 effectively prevented treason trials. This is the 
reason why only two of the 40-odd insurrectionists indicted for high treason 
following the siege of Fort Cumberland were actually tried, and why no treason 
5 See generally Ernest Clarke, The Siege of Fort Cumberland, 1776 (Kingston & Montreal, 1995). 
6 This and the paragraph following depends upon the introduction to Ernest A. Clarke and Jim 
Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression in Nova Scotia in the Era of the American Revolution", in 
Greenwood and Wright, eds., Law, Politics, and Security Measures, pp. 172-3. 
7 The only other comparable proceedings were R. v. Patten (Hilary Term 1779) "For Treasonable 
Practices" and "for Encouraging Desertion from his Majesty's Troops". The Halifax grand jury 
initially declined to consider the former for want of crown witnesses, while returning true bill on the 
latter: N.S. Supreme Court, Pleas of the Crown, Easter Term 1765 to Michaelmas 1783: RG 39, 
series J (HX), vol. 1, pp. 333-4, 338, PANS. Patten was never tried, and all proceedings against 
him were finally ordered terminated by the lieutenant-governor in May 1780: Secretary [Bulkeley] to 
Attorney-General [Brenton], 9 May 1780, Secretary's letter-book, p. 279, RG 1, vol. 136, PANS. 
Joseph Patten JP (1710-1787), a New England Planter from Massachusetts, was the senior patriot 
leader in Granville Township, Annapolis County — a 'Yankee' by no means 'neutral'; see generally 
A.W. Savary, Supplement to [W.A. Calnek] History of the County of Annapolis (Toronto, 1913), 
pp. 35-6. 
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indictments were preferred after local proclamation of the act in August 1777.8 The 
language of the second indictment preferred against Salter in April 17789 makes 
clear that the government thought they had good grounds for charging him with 
high treason and that they fully intended doing so should the inconvenient statutory 
bar be removed. Though the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act did not forbid charging 
a suspect with high treason — arrest, detention and indictment were allowed, while 
recognizance, bail and trial were prohibited — there was no point in doing so while 
the act was in force. Better, then, to confine formal charges to triable indictments 
than for the government to prefer a charge which could not proceed to trial without 
special permission from Whitehall. 
The loyalty of the members of the pre-Planter New England mercantile elite io of 
Halifax, according to Lewis Fischer, was secured by their anticipation of sustained 
economic growth based on sharply rising pre-war levels of trade and commerce — 
in other words, the prospect of wresting control of the lucrative West Indies trade 
from their New England competitors.11 It is ironic that Salter, who exemplified the 
entrepreneurial stratum within Halifax's New England mercantile elite, 12 ultimately 
became the victim of his own determination to compete • with and remain 
independent of the old Anglo-European mercantile elite, personified by Joshua 
Mauger. Salter's biographer makes the telling point that he "was the only leading 
Haligonian prosecuted during the American revolution who was not defended by 
Mauger's associates"13 — the reason being that Salter was indebted to Mauger's 
8 These insights derive from Clarke and Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression". 
An Act to impower his Majesty to secure and detain Persons charged with, or suspected of, the 
Crime of High Treason, committed in any of his Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in America..., 
{Mil) 17 Geo. 3, c. 9. The emergency measures Habeas Corpus Suspension Act was subject to 
annual renewal, and was renewed five times before being allowed to expire in January 1783. It is 
arguable that the proliferation of prosecutions for 'high misdemeanor' or 'treasonable practices', 
rather than high treason per se, can be attributed to the authorities' desire to circumvent the Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act, which prevented them from either bailing or trying an accused for treason, 
and effectively suspended the legal right "to be tried within a reasonable time". 
9 Depositions and Other Papers Connected with Crown Prosecutions between 1749 and 1780, RG 1, 
vol. 342, doc. 80, PANS. 
10 It is necessary to distinguish between New England Planters of the period 1759-1764 and New 
England settlers of the decade preceding the Planter immigration. Pre-1759 emigrants from urban 
New England, such as Salter, were not 'Planters' in the same sense as post-1759 New England and 
Ulster immigrant farmers and fishermen who both colonized the vacant Acadian lands and founded 
new townships on the south and southwestern shores of Nova Scotia. 
11 Lewis R. Fischer, "Revolution without Independence: The Canadian Colonies, 1749-1775", in 
Ronald Hoffman et al., eds., The Economy of Early America: The Revolutionary Period, 1763-1790 
(Charlottesville VA, 1988), pp. 94-5ff. 
12 Lewis R. Fischer, '"Revolution without Independence': The Halifax Merchants and The American 
Revolution, 1749-1775", paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical 
Association, June 1978, p. 12 [ms.]. Elsewhere, Fischer points out that "after 1764 New Englanders 
never comprised less than 85 per cent of all [Halifax] merchants": "Canadian Colonies", p. 107. 
13 S. Buggey, "Salter, Malachy (Malachi)", in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. IV, p. 696. 
The reason for Salter's isolation and vulnerability was that John Butler, Mauger's principal agent 
and the army paymaster, was not only Salter's most pressing creditor but also a member of 
Council. Some merchants being more equal than others, Butler was exonerated of the charge of 
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associates, who were not about to leap to the defence of a hard-pressed competitor, 
much less incriminate themselves by opposing government action against an 
exemplary seditionist. "Although Salter", writes Fischer, 
like so many successful merchants, managed to gain his share of place 
holdings, his principal interests were always in trade and commerce. His 
connections, both mercantile and familial, were chiefly with New England, 
but his network of commercial correspondents stretched at least as far 
down the coast as Philadelphia. To serve his expanding trading interests, 
Salter invested heavily in shipping, becoming the most important 
shipowner in the town [of Halifax] following Mauger's departure [in 
1760].i4 
Salter, writes Brebner, "was notable in that he chose to maintain his commercial 
contacts with New England, which had been his home".15 He was even more 
remarkable in that he chose to persevere following the outbreak of rebellion and 
civil war in New England, refusing to sacrifice his investment despite the trade 
embargo. Yet there also were pressing financial reasons for Salter's determination 
to take advantage of the new economic opportunities presented by what soon 
became a revolutionary war. Importuned by creditors, he had taken over as master 
of his newest and largest trading vessel, the brigantine Rising Sun. As early as 
1774, his creditors, pursuing him down the south shore from Halifax to Liverpool, 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the vessel impounded.16 
Though the ordeal of Malachy Salter was atypical of the experience of the old 
New England mercantile elite of Halifax, his very failure to capitalize on the war 
shows why Fischer's "revolution without independence" model, which draws 
heavily upon the evidence of Salter's career, forms the basis for a new economic 
interpretation of the failure of the American Revolution in Nova Scotia. Other 
scholars have also recognized the importance of mercantile issues and have 
identified Salter as one of those merchants who had "waxed fat from war contracts" 
during the previous war.17 Fischer himself, however, neglects to consider the impact 
corresponding with the enemy in February 1776; he was too powerful to be subjected to the 
indignity of a sedition indictment: Minutes of Council, 8 February 1776, RG 1, vol. 189, PANS. 
14 Fischer, "Revolution without Independence", p. 103. 
15 John Bartlet Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during the 
Revolutionary Years ([1937] New York, 1970), p. 21. 
16 Harold A. Innis, ed., The Diary of Simeon Perkins, 1766-1780 (Toronto, 1948), pp. 72-3 (April-May 
1774), 79 (Aug 1774), 157 (July 1777). 
17 Wilfred Brenton Kerr, The Maritime Provinces of British North America and the American 
Revolution (Sackville NB, [1942]), p. 12; cf. Brebner, Neutral Yankees, pp. 19-20. The original 
proponent of the theory of an homogeneous merchant-loyalism was Viola F. Barnes, "Francis 
Legge, Governor of Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1773-1776", New England Quarterly, 4 (July 1931), pp. 
425ff. In his article, "The Merchants of Nova Scotia and the American Revolution", Canadian 
Historical Review, 13, 1 (March 1932), pp. 20-36, W.B. Kerr offered a critique of the Barnes thesis 
"that the influential Halifax merchants were directly responsible for keeping Nova Scotia loyal to 
the Crown"; see George A. Rawlyk's important historiographical essay, "The American Revolution 
and Nova Scotia Reconsidered", Dalhousie Review, 43, 3 (Autumn 1963), pp. 379-80 and 391 n. 5. 
See also Reginald C. Stuart, United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 
(Chapel Hill NC & London, 1988), p. 18, and "A Revolution Repeatedly Rejected, 1774-1871", in 
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which Salter's indebtedness, not to mention his years-long persecution as a 
suspected state criminal, had on his commercial activities. Also left out of 
consideration are the kinship ties which bound the old New England mercantile 
elite, of which Salter was the most prominent and prestigious member, to the old 
New England official elite.18 
The death of Chief Justice Jonathan Belcher, at the end of March 1776, seems to 
have removed the last restraint on legal repression of "the more radical New 
England element at Halifax" and elsewhere. Belcher was not replaced for two years 
and, during the hiatus, the government evinced no reluctance to suppress political 
dissent on the part of "the extreme New England republican wing of the local 
opposition".19 As early as July 1776 Attorney-General William Nesbitt illegally 
laid an ex officio criminal information for high treason against one Thomas 
Falconer [Faulkner], a New England Planter of Londonderry Township.20 Though 
prosecutions by way of information for anything other than high misdemeanours 
were ultra vires under the criminal procedure of England as in force in Nova Scotia, 
the offence was non-bailable and the accused was detained without trial until the 
next term, when the indictment (for "treasonable practices") which had afterwards 
been preferred against him was quashed by the grand jury.21 It is inconceivable that 
Chief Justice Belcher would have tolerated this flagrant abuse of process — unless 
John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies 
(Montreal & Kingston, 1994), pp. 9-14. Yet neither Kerr's critique of Barnes nor Rawlyk's critique 
of Kerr really undermines the basis of the Barnes thesis, of which Fischer's economic reinterpretation 
is both a recapitulation and a revision. On the other hand, an inherent weakness of this whole 
approach may be that it confines the scope of the economic interpretation to the leverage exercised 
by the metropolitan mercantile elite. 
18 Salter himself had been briefly an ally of Nova Scotia's Bostonian first chief justice, Jonathan 
Belcher. His son and namesake, Dr Malachy Salter Jr, would later marry a daughter of Justice 
Charles Morris of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. Councillor Morris, originally from 
Massachusetts, served as acting chief justice of the province from March 1776 to April 1778 and in 
that capacity presided not only at the treason trials of the patriot besiegers of Fort Cumberland, but 
also at Salter's trial, in February 1777, for uttering seditious words. 
19 The phrase is Winthrop Bell's, used in reference to the administration of Charles Lawrence, 
1754-60: W.P. Bell, The "Foreign Protestants" and the Settlement of Nova Scotia: The History of 
a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth Century ([1961] Fredericton and 
Sackville NB, 1990), p. 465. 
20 Pleas of the Crown, 15 July and 11 October 1776, RG 39, series J (HX), vol. 1, pp. 257, 262; 
petition of Thomas Faulkner, 10 February 1777 (endorsement), RG 1, vol. 342 doc. 59, PANS. The 
original charge against Faulkner was changed from statutory high treason to the high 
misdemeanour of 'treasonable practices' because no grand jury could be persuaded to return true bill 
on an indictment for high treason unless the accused were shown to have taken up arms against the 
king. Faulkner, who afterwards led a contingent from the Cobequid townships at the siege of Fort 
Cumberland, was to be one of only two indicted rebels tried for high treason in April 1777. 
21 The high prerogative expedient of ex officio criminal informations was available only for 
prosecuting misdemeanours; ergo, the Faulkner prosecution was illegal and unconstitutional. 
The "quasi-independent township of Londonderry", as Brebner {Neutral Yankees, p. 39) calls it, 
though colonized 14 years earlier, was not formally erected until March 1775 — scarcely a month 
before the outbreak of rebellion in New England. Londonderry subsequently showed itself to be the 
least rebellious of the three Cobequid Bay townships, having been settled mainly by Ulstermen 
rather than by New England Planters. See generally Mary Ellen Wright, '"...of a Licentious and 
Rebellious disposition' — the Cobequid Townships and the American Revolution", Collections of 
the Royal Nova Scotia Historical Society, 42 (1986), pp. 27-40. 
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as an unavoidable side effect of the government's proclamation of martial law on 5 
December 1775, in which the moribund chief justice, as ex officio president of the 
Council, had no choice but to acquiesce. Attorney-General Nesbitt probably took 
advantage of the fact that neither of the assistant judges of the Supreme Court — 
the senior of whom (Isaac Deschamps) replaced Belcher as acting chief justice — 
was a lawyer. Whether their ignorance of criminal procedure (not to mention the 
1695/6 Treason Trials Regulation Act) excused the judges' failure to counter the 
abuse of process by the chief crown attorney begs the question of judicial 
complicity in official repression. The Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which 
permitted arrest and detention without bail or trial — on mere suspicion, not to 
mention accusation or misprison of treason — cannot be pleaded in extenuation of 
the judges' action, because it was not passed and did not become law until 1777. 
The late chief justice, concerning whom "the tradition is emphatic that he was 
distinctly in sympathy with the Revolution",22 had had close links with Halifax's 
Protestant Dissenters' Meeting-House [Mather's Congregational], and with its 
interim supply, Parson Seccombe of Chester, afterwards accused of seditious 
preaching. Thanks to the proliferation of independently-minded New England 
merchants such as Salter among its lay leaders, Mather's Church came to be 
viewed by government as the seed-bed of whig-patriotism in the capital. "So much 
concern did the political sympathies of this congregation give the Governor", writes 
the church historian, "that extraordinary means were taken to thwart them".23 In 
broader ideological terms, moreover, the significance of the ordeal of Malachy 
Salter was not lost on those of his New England compatriots whose 
Congregationalism accommodated both religious and political dissent. If "the 
Revolution made Congregationalism...unpleasantly synonymous with rebellious 
sympathies", then Salter was "naturally suspected" not only "because of his New 
England connections", but also because of "his leading position at Mather's".24 
Salter was thus trapped in a vicious circle: the fact that they had selected him as 
moderator drew suspicion upon the congregation, while the congregation's 
uncompromising New Englishness cast the veil of suspicion over its paramount 
leader. The government's continuing prosecution-cum-persecution of Malachy Salter 
cries out for detailed analysis as a case study of ambiguous or divided loyalty, 
combining elements of politics, trade and religion. As a conscientious patriot, as a 
seagoing merchant suspected of trading with the enemy and as a pillar of the New 
England Congregational 'mother church', Salter made altogether too conspicuous a 
22 Eaton, "Halifax and the American Revolution", p. 198. 
23 Walter C. Murray, "History of St. Matthew's Church, Halifax, N.S.", Collections of the Nova 
Scotia Historical Society, 16 (1912), p. 164. One of the foundational myths of Mather's church is 
that the 65-acre glebe was 'confiscated' as a result of the 'treason trials' of Parson Seccombe of 
Chester and Salter: ibid., p. 152; Ian F. MacKinnon, Settlements and Churches in Nova Scotia 
1749-1776 [Montreal, 1930], pp. 72 n. 3, 97 n. 4; [R.M. Hattie], Looking Backward over Two 
Centuries: A Short History of St. Matthew's United Church... (Halifax, 1949), p. 12. Of course, no 
such trials ever took place, and escheat and forfeiture could only follow a conviction for high 
treason or judgment of outlawry against the accused. 
24 Brebner, Neutral Yankees, pp. 192, 340. 
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target. 
The "ardent republican", who studied the biography of the regicide and observed 
the anniversary of King Charles I's execution as a private holiday,25 was not about 
to renege on his political principles because those of like mind had taken up arms 
against King George in defence of the very principles to which Salter himself 
adhered. His reputation appears even to have preceded him to England, whither he 
had gone on a trading voyage, for, in July 1776, the secretary at the Treasury wrote 
to the permanent under-secretary at the American Department informing him that a 
vessel lying in the Thames, the owner-master of which was Malachy Salter, was 
suspected of being bound for Massachusetts — in direct violation of the Boston 
Port Act. The secretary of state himself was concerned enough to write on the same 
subject a few days later to the new lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia, advising 
him that a vessel owned and commanded by Salter was believed to be carrying 
goods from London to Nova Scotia in transit to Boston, and instructing him to 
prevent all contraband trade with the colonies in rebellion.26 Commodore Marriot 
Arbuthnot RN, commissioner of the naval dockyard, who had taken over the 
government in May, replied that he would do his "utmost to prevent any 
intercourse or Correspondence between the Colonies in Rebellion, and any Persons 
in this Province".27 This blanket prohibition against written communication, which 
derived from Governor Legge's proclamation of 5 July 1775 forbidding aid to the 
rebels,28 laid the groundwork for the government's four-year-long vendetta against 
Malachy Salter. 
Salter returned from England in the autumn of 1776. His ordeal, which began in 
earnest in the aftermath of the raising of the patriot siege of Fort Cumberland, 
coincided with a period of accelerated legal repression. The government's 
25 "My great-great-grandfather," wrote Susannah Duffus Morrow, "was an ardent republican; beside 
him in his portrait is painted the 'Life of Cromwell', the name distinctly marked on the back of the 
book; while on the anniversary of the death of King Charles, Mr. Salter always had a sheep's head 
for dinner. I do not just see the connection, unless he meant to imply a resemblance between the two 
heads": [Anon.], Family History, p. 252. The unsigned and undated painting to which Mrs Stairs 
referred (probably an early Copley) now hangs in the Legislative Library at Province House in 
Halifax. 
26 J. Robinson to W. Knox, 12 July 1776, Colonial Office Series [CO] 5 (America and the West 
Indies — Original Correspondence, etc.)/ vol. 147/ folios 320-1, Public Record Office [PRO]; G. 
Germain to M. Arbuthnot, 20 July 1776, CO 217 (Nova Scotia — Original Correspondence)/ vol. 
52/ folio 162 (draft), PRO (mfm at PANS). See Judith Norton, comp., New England Planters in the 
Maritime Provinces of Canada, 1759-1800: Bibliography of Primary Sources (Toronto, 1993), p. 
21, §156. 
27 Arbuthnot to Germain, 3 October 1776, CO 217/52/226r, PRO. 
28 "Proclamation forbidding persons to Aid or Correspond with any persons in Rebellion", 5 July 
1775, CO 217/51/282r-283v, PRO. Murdoch states, "the governor issued a proclamation, 
forbidding all persons in this province from corresponding with or assisting the 'rebels' in New 
England, and directed the justices of the peace to publish it, and cause it to be read several times in 
all places of public worship": Nova-Scotia, p. 548. Eaton ("Halifax and the American Revolution", 
p. 201) considers this to be an economic warfare measure in response to the Nonexportation 
Resolution of Congress (17 May 1775), which placed an embargo on trade with the other American 
colonies not yet in rebellion. 
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post-insurrection strategy aimed particularly at suppressing sedition through 
comprehensive use of the criminal law.29 Indeed the two sedition trials — of 
Houghton first, then Salter — were held expeditiously in the winter of 1777, while 
the two treason trials were deferred until the spring. Salter was tried and convicted 
of uttering seditious words in February 1777. Indicted again, scarcely a year later, 
for corresponding with the enemy, he saw the indictment quashed on a technicality. 
His reindictment on a more substantive and serious charge,30 was not proceeded 
with because it appeared to charge high treason in the guise of high misdemeanour. 
Treason trials were banned by the imperial Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which 
was passed the very month of Salter's trial, and came into force six months later. 
Salter nevertheless lay under the third indictment for nearly three years, until his 
death in January 1781. The prosecutorial compromise struck between the law 
officers was indefinite continuance, only aggravating the tension which must have 
been felt by the victim of the prosecution. Like the New England Planter magistrate 
Timothy Houghton of Chester — tried and convicted for high misdemeanour a mere 
two days earlier than Salter31 — the latter, whose "misfortunes seem to have 
broken him",32 did not live to see the end of the war. 
The proliferation of indictments for "treasonable practices" (constructive treason) 
rather than high treason tout court, as well as the tendency for indictments to be 
indefinitely continued and never to come to trial, can both be attributed to the 
overarching impact of the five-year-long Habeas Corpus Suspension Act on the 
government's tactical planning for the prosecution of crimes against the state. The 
misdemeanour classification was therefore little more than a convenient legal 
fiction. Salter eventually fled to England because he feared that all that stood 
between him and a treason trial was the renewal of the temporary Habeas Corpus 
Suspension Act. If it were not renewed, then the way was clear for him to be 
indicted and tried for high treason. Though Salter could have been indicted for 
outlawry (high treason in absentia), he could not have been tried while the Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act was in force. Had the act not been renewed, however, there 
would have been more indictees on high treason than those three dozen arising from 
the patriot siege of Fort Cumberland, and Malachy Salter would surely have been 
one of them. 
After his first return from England in October 1776, Salter had begun to interest 
himself in the welfare of American prisoners of war incarcerated at Halifax. His 
charitable ministrations to the sick or wounded Americans subsisting on board a 
29 In contrast, Clarke and Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression", p. 200, argue that the 1777-80 Salter 
prosecution exemplified "a reluctance" on the part of government "to invoke the heavy hand of the 
law". 
30 "Treason imputed to a person by law from his conduct or course of actions, though his deeds taken 
severally do not amount to actual [high] treason": Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St Paul MN, 
1990), p. 1501. 
31 See Barry Cahill, "The Sedition Trial of Timothy Houghton: Repression in a Marginal New 
England Planter Township during the Revolutionary Years", Acadiensis, XXIV, 1 (Autumn 1994), 
pp. 35-58. 
32 Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. 341 n. 137. 
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hospital ship in Halifax Harbour while awaiting the prisoner exchange cartel, 
brought him into contact with one Dr John Jeffries, a Boston Tory emigrant refugee 
who had arrived in Halifax in April 1776. Jeffries, whose patriot father was the 
long-time treasurer of the town of Boston, was surgeon to the General Hospital in 
Halifax from 1776 to 1779. In November 1776 Dr Jeffries had a casual 
conversation with Salter, with whom he was barely acquainted, in which the latter 
declared that "he was always of the Side of the Americans In their Conduct, untill 
they declared their Indypendence and then he quit or Left them".33 Salter, who had 
carelessly assumed that Dr Jeffries, a scion of Boston gentry, was no less ardent a 
republican than his father — and Salter himself — was denounced to the 
authorities by his scandalized interlocutor.34 Salter, who declared himself to be 
against American independence, was not opposed in principle to the American 
rebellion, which he saw as the continuation of political protest by other means. As 
a patriotic American, Salter could conceive of no lesser response to tyranny and 
oppression. It would be going too far to say that the old New England mercantile 
elite filled the role of a fifth column in Halifax during the war: "Merchants appear 
to have been equivocal, supporting resistance but taking a conservative stance 
about rebellion".35 But Salter was atypical. He appears to have been unequivocal, 
supporting rebellion but taking a conservative stance about independence. 
The government took a serious view of what they evidently construed as a 
deliberate attempt by a prominent local patriot to seduce a prominent Loyalist 
refugee from his allegiance. Salter was charged with speaking seditious words, 
indicted and tried for misdemeanour in the Supreme Court in February 1777. The 
only witness against him was the deponent, Dr Jeffries, who testified that the 
accused said, "he thought the Americans were Much in the Right of it to make the 
Stand they did". Though he was convicted, the verdict against Salter was qualified; 
the jury declined to return a general verdict of guilty as charged because the crown 
failed to prove seditious intention. As the court did not order a trial de novo, and 
the accused could not be granted an absolute discharge, Salter was bound over, 
33 The Deposition of John Jeffries..., 16 November 1776, RG 1, vol. 342, doc. 77, PANS. The 
deposition was drafted by Attorney-General Nesbitt and sworn before Secretary Bulkeley. 
Concerning Dr Jeffries see Allan Everett Marble, Surgeons, Smallpox and the Poor: A History of 
Medicine and Social Conditions in Nova Scotia, 1749-1799 (Montreal & Kingston, 1993), p. 343. 
34 "He is the Tory refugee", wrote Thomas H. Raddall of Dr Jeffries, "who betrayed Malachi Salter to 
the courts": His Majesty's Yankees (New York, 1943), pp. 322, 324. The ordeal of Malachy Salter is 
a well-developed subtheme in Raddall's first historical novel, set in Nova Scotia during the 
revolutionary years, 1774-8. See generally Barry Moody, "The Novelist as Historian: The Nova 
Scotia Identity in the Novels of Thomas H. Raddall", in Alan R. Young, ed., Time & Place: The 
Life and Works of Thomas H. Raddall (Fredericton, 1991), pp. 140-53. 
Elsewhere Raddall characterizes the 'Yankee merchants' (namely, Salter and Simeon Perkins) as 
typical of Nova Scotia's New Englanders: "cautious, measuring their American sympathies against 
the British strength by sea, and hoping that somehow the Nova Scotians could stay neutral in what 
seemed to them a ruinous brawl": Thomas H. Raddall, The Path of Destiny: Canada from the 
British Conquest to Home Rule: 1763-1850 (Toronto, 1957), p. 79 
35 Stuart, United States Expansionism, p. 18. 
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securities worth £1000 being ordered produced to ensure his good behaviour.3^ The 
case attracted attention in Boston, where John Gill's radical patriot Continental 
Journal and Weekly Advertiser described how Salter had been prosecuted "on 
account of some expressions in favour of America".37 An immediate result of 
Salter's conviction was that when the next general commission of the peace was 
issued his name was omitted, though he had been a justice of the peace 
continuously for over 16 years.38 
Despite Salter's notorious rebel sympathies, his 160-ton brigantine was at no 
less risk from American privateers than any other Nova Scotian merchantman. In 
July 1777 the inevitable happened: the Rising Sun was taken outside Liverpool en 
route to Halifax from Bermuda and was conveyed to Salem, Massachusetts.39 
From July to September Salter was in Boston, where he petitioned the council of 
state to be allowed to resettle, on the grounds that, "having Suffer'd severely, both 
in person & property on account of his political principles, and for the favor and 
assistance he afforded to the American Seamen & Others in Captivity there 
[Halifax], his residence in that Province must render him very unhappy".40 Whether 
Salter was serious about returning to Halifax to collect his family and settle his 
affairs before removing permanently to his hometown of Boston, or the petition 
was merely a ruse calculated to procure his escape from Massachusetts, the council 
granted him safe conduct. By October Salter was back home in Halifax; he never 
set foot in Boston again. Before the end of the month the storm broke over his 
head. The government called in Solicitor-General Gibbons to advise "in the Case of 
Mr Salter lately from Boston Suspected of Treasonable & Criminal Practices 
&c."41 Suspecting that he was at best a middleman, at worst a double agent who 
intended to convert Nova Scotian treasury bills and provincial warrants for the 
purpose of financing the rebel war effort, the government took decisive measures. 
Treasurer Benjamin Green (another former Bostonian) was ordered to stop payment 
on all warrants presumed to have originated in New England.42 
Within days of his return, Salter was writing to his former business partner in 
Boston, the merchant Bartholomew Kneeland, 
36 Crown Prosecutions, RG 1, vol. 342, docs. 77, 78; Pleas of the Crown, RG 39, series J (HX), vol. 
1, p. 280 (Hilary Term 1777), PANS. 
37 19 June 1777, cited in Clifford K. Shipton, comp., Sibley's Harvard Graduates, Volume XV : 
1761-1763 (Boston, 1970), pp. 421-2 n. 11. 
38 Commission Book, 5 May 1777, RG 1, vol. 168, pp. 500-2, PANS. 
39 Innis, Simeon Perkins, p. 157 (7 July 1777). 
40 Edmund Duvar Poole, comp., Annals of Yarmouth and Barrington (Nova Scotia) in the 
Revolutionary War (Yarmouth, 1899), pp. 31-2, quoting Massachusetts Archives (manuscript 
documents series), vols. 159, p. 168; 183, p. 136. 
41 The tortuous progress of R. v. Salter (2nd) can easily be followed through Solicitor-General 
Gibbons' cumulative statement of account, Mil-9 (2 April 1779): "Manuscript Documents of Nova 
Scotia", RG 1, vol. 248, doc. 13, PANS. 
42 Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. 341. 
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The times are Such I am almost afraid to put pen to paper...there is an 
order to the Treasurer to Stop paym.t for my Treas.15 notes. I am forbid to 
speak to the prisoners [of war], and I apprehend my life to be in danger as 
I have been much threat'ned, for being suppos'd a friend to the Rebels. ...I 
am forbid sending Money or any thing Else in the Cartel [prisoner 
exchange vessel]. I beg you will be cautious in what you write me, I stand 
on very ticklish ground, & must be very Circumspect...I could say many 
things but must forbear, you'll hear further from me soon. I am indeed 
very full of trouble.43 
The letter, in which Salter indiscreetly mentioned that he hoped to sail for England 
"in about a month", was confiscated from the cartel before it sailed. A mere two 
days after the letter was written, the Council ordered Salter's arrest and detention 
on suspicion of "Crimes and Misdemeanours against Government"; 
Solicitor-General Gibbons was afterwards directed to draw up and transmit "an 
Opinion upon Mr Salters intercepted Letter".44 Though he had not been charged, 
and so was not eligible for bail, Salter was ordered to post a £1000 bond to secure 
his release from custody and appearance at the next sitting of the Supreme Court, 
to answer any charges which might be found against him. Otherwise he would have 
remained one of "the Persons now confm'd in the Jail of Halifax for promoting 
Rebellion and such treasonable practices...".45 
The moratorium on the redemption of treasury notes was repealed one week after 
its imposition, whether because the government already had the exhibit evidence 
they needed — the intercepted letter to Kneeland — in order to charge Salter with 
sedition; because Salter's creditors in Halifax, such as Councillor John Butler, 
wanted his debts repaid; or because the government thought the better of painting 
with the broad brush of sedition everyone holding redeemable treasury notes of 
possible New England provenance. To be sure, corresponding on any business 
matter, however innocuous, with anyone in New England (especially Boston) — 
the more so in that Salter's letter must have been smuggled on board the cartel, 
without the captain's knowledge — was prima facie evidence of sedition because it 
violated Governor Legge's proclamation of July 1775 prohibiting correspondence 
with the rebels. Crimes and misdemeanours against government were the only 
common law offences for which someone could be arrested on suspicion and held, 
thanks to the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which provided the legal pretext for 
detention without trial. Though appearances may have been deceptive in Salter's 
case, the government was legitimately concerned with both appearance and reality. 
Overburdened with 500 prisoners (both military and civilian) in custody, hopelessly 
inadequate penal facilities and an acting sheriff, Thomas Bridge, who just 
43 M. Salter to B. Kneeland, 8 Nov 1777, Crown Prosecutions, RG 1, vol. 342, doc. 82, PANS 
(emphasis added). 
44 For this and what follows see minutes of Council, 10, 15 and 22 November 1777, RG 1, vol. 189, 
pp. 433ff.; Solicitor-General's Statement of Account, RG 1, vol. 248, doc. 13, PANS. 
45 Minutes of Council, 30 December 1777, RG 1, vol. 189, p. 436, PANS. 
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happened to be Salter's son-in-law as well as one of his sureties, the government 
had every reason to be deeply apprehensive of the continuing security risk posed by 
Salter. 
It is probably no coincidence that Salter fled Nova Scotia for the relative safety 
of England the very month — January 1778 — when the Habeas Corpus 
Suspension Act was due to expire; he could not have learned of its renewal before 
his arrival overseas. Though Salter applied for and received from the 
lieutenant-governor a leave of absence to go to England on business, and was gone 
before any indictment could be preferred against him, he was in direct violation of 
his parole. Having broken a solemn undertaking that he would present himself to 
answer any charges which might be laid against him at the next sitting of the 
Supreme Court, Salter was rendering himself vulnerable to a process for outlawry.46 
In January 1778, after he had left the province, Salter was indicted for 
misdemeanour for secretly corresponding with the enemy; the only substantive 
evidence against him was his letter to the Boston merchant, Kneeland. Though a 
simple majority of the grand jury was prepared to accept Attorney-General Nesbitt's 
rather limited indictment, the panel was sharply divided over the merits of the 
crown's case. True bill was returned, but the indictment was null and void because 
an absolute majority (12) was required for the accused to be tried, and only 10 of 
the grand jurors were in favour. Nevertheless, the crown — now represented not by 
Nesbitt but by his deputy, Solicitor-General Gibbons — was granted a continuance; 
a nolle prosequi should have been entered or, more properly, a stay of proceedings 
ordered by the court. 
In Easter Term 1778 R. v. Salter resumed. Solicitor-General Gibbons, taking no 
chances, drafted a new, longer and much more expansive indictment which charged 
constructive high treason. The grand jury voted 16 in favour of finding a true bill, 
whereupon counsel for the crown, in the absence of the accused, had no alternative 
but to move either for judgment of outlawry or that the recognizance be forfeited for 
non-appearance. Solicitor-General Gibbons chose the latter course, arguing that the 
recognizance was forfeitable because it had been made for personal, not legal, 
appearance. Counsel for the accused, former solicitor-general James Brenton, 
argued against the motion, which, if granted, would have led to forfeiture of the 
recognizance and made Salter, as well as his sureties, Thomas Bridge and John 
Fillis,47 debtors to the crown for a substantial sum. Defence counsel then moved for 
leave to traverse (contradict) the indictment, which motion was denied by the 
court.48 Unable to try the accused on the true bill found against him and unwilling 
46 Clarke and Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression", pp. 192-5. For this and what follows, unless 
otherwise indicated, see Crown Prosecutions, RG 1, vol. 342, docs. 79-80, 82-5 [1777-9]; Pleas of 
the Crown, RG 39, series J (HX), vol. 1, pp. 311, 321, 340, 376 [1778-80], PANS. 
47 John Fillis JP and MHA was Halifax's leading distiller and rum merchant; his daughter was 
married to Salter's son. See generally James F. Smith, "John Fillis, MLA", in Nova Scotia 
Historical Quarterly, I, 4 (December 1971), pp. 307-23. 
48 Justice Isaac Deschamps bench-book, under date 14 April 1778, Royal Nova Scotia Historical 
Society fonds, MG 20, vol. 221, file 91.5, PANS. 
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to order a stay of proceedings,49 the court decided to continue both the recognizance 
and the indictment to the next term. This was but the first of 11 continuances, 
which were granted until Michaelmas Term 1780, eight months after Salter had 
returned to the province, having been absent for more than two years. Despite his 
return, he was neither tried nor granted a conditional discharge. Only his death, on 
13 January 1781, a few weeks short of his 65th birthday, put an end to the 
interminable series of continuances and removed the oppressive indictment. 
The crux of R. v. Salter is why proceedings continued after Trinity Term (July) 
1778, when the lieutenant-governor — taking, as it were, the law into his own 
hands — ordered it stayed.50 There are a number of possible explanations: a new 
lieutenant-governor had been appointed, and was to take office within the month; 
the new chief justice (Bryan Finucane) had only begun to preside; or, by far the 
likeliest explanation, Attorney-General Nesbitt took exception to a nonconsultative 
motion on the part of his junior by coming into court within days of the 
government's stay of proceedings order and moving successfully for another 
continuance. Given that the indictment was already subject to a continuance, the 
motion for a stay of proceedings had to be made in open court by senior crown 
counsel by right of preaudience. Precedence at the bar, therefore — no trifling 
matter among colonial British North American lawyers — may well have been the 
issue that ultimately frustrated Solicitor-General Gibbons' attempt to carry out the 
lieutenant-governor's executive order. In such a charged atmosphere, even the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion would have been strictly circumscribed. 
Ironically, it was this lawyers' imbroglio which enabled Malachy Salter to 
prolong his absence from Nova Scotia without suffering any adverse consequences 
to his property. He left Halifax under a recognizance and returned home two years 
later to find himself lying under indictment for constructive high treason. He might 
have met a far worse fate had the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which was 
subject to annual expiration, not been renewed regularly by special act of 
Parliament. Towards the end of the first year of the act's operation, the government 
of Nova Scotia was forced to consider the implications of non-renewal of the act for 
its strategy of legal repression. There was concern enough in official circles that the 
law officers were asked to develop a contingency plan which would provide for 
49 The court was apparently also unwilling to issue process of outlawry against Salter; see generally 
Clarke and Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression", notes 122-6 and accompanying text. This would 
have permitted the immediate confiscation of his very considerable holdings of real estate. Salter 
owned all the property now occupied by Maritime Centre, St Matthew's Church and Government 
House, in the heart of the south suburbs of the old town of Halifax — not to mention large 
landholdings elsewhere on the peninsula and outside Halifax Township and County: Estate of 
Malachy Salter, Halifax County Court of Probate, file S 6 (mfm at PANS). 
50 R. Bulkeley to R. Gibbons, 22 July 1778, Secretary's letter-book, RG 1, vol. 136, p. 266, PANS. 
The stay of proceedings ordered by the lieutenant-governor against the advice of Attorney-General 
Nesbitt was ignored by Solicitor-General Gibbons, who acted as chief crown prosecuting attorney 
until Salter's counsel, Brenton, replaced Nesbitt as attorney-general in October 1779. The 
solicitor-general's ability to act more or less independently of the attorney-general suggests that 
Salter may have been spared a trial on the second indictment because of a debilitating stasis 
between the law officers of the crown. 
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suspects to continue to be detained without trial, or prosecuted for some statutory or 
common law offence (e.g., sedition).51 In England Salter was immune from a trial 
for high treason regardless of whether the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act was 
renewed or not. In Nova Scotia he was not, as the contents of the second indictment 
— constructive high treason disguised as sedition — showed clearly. 
Salter's authorized and certainly well-publicized departure52 for England in 
January 1778 coincided with the second proceeding against him. Once safely there, 
he remained for two years, perhaps not so much in order to attend to his tangled 
business affairs as to protect himself against the potentially fatal consequences of 
non-renewal of the disabling Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. After Attorney-
General Nesbitt finally retired, in March 1779, and was duly succeeded by his 
protégé, Brenton (hitherto Salter's counsel), the prosecution was postponed for the 
duration of Salter's life.53 Continued for more than two years, or eight terms, the 
indictment never came to trial. Despite Solicitor-General Gibbons' determination to 
charge Salter with high treason in April 1778, no useful purpose would have been 
served by indicting a suspected traitor for a crime for which he could not have been 
tried. Though Attorney-General Nesbitt certainly did not advise the lieutenant-
governor to order a stay of proceedings, and interposed his authority in order to 
secure yet another continuance, it was Nesbitt's successor, Brenton, who saw to it 
that the ageing, worn-out and ill Salter was not subjected to the ignominy of a 
second sedition trial. 
If, as Brebner argues, the affair of Governor Legge committed the oligarchy of 
Halifax officialdom to loyalism,54 then the "dramatic increases in trade and shifts 
in its pattern"55 on the eve of the American Revolution also committed the old New 
England mercantile elite of Halifax to a strategy of economic brinkmanship and 
politically untenable bipartisanship. Like the neutral Americans during the 
Napoleonic Wars, the "neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia" during the Revolutionary 
years wished to trade with both belligerents — in defiance of imperial and colonial 
government policy. In business as well as personal terms, therefore, Malachy 
Salter, the most prominent but least typical member of the elite, lost the war and 
did not survive long enough to contest the peace. The old, pre-planter New England 
mercantile elite died with him. 
51 "As the Act of Parliament for Securing and detaining persons charg'd with or Suspected of the 
Crime of High Treason [Habeas Corpus Suspension Act] will expire at the end of this year; The 
Lieutenant Governor desires that you will consider the Consequence thereof in respect of such 
personfs] as may be now Confin'd in Jail in this Province under the Authority of said Act and how 
far such persons may be detained or prosecuted under any other Law": R. Bulkeley to W. Nesbitt, 
16 December 1777 [copy], Secretary's letter-book, RG 1, vol. 136, p. 258, PANS. In response to the 
letter from the provincial secretary, Solicitor-General Gibbons submitted "a long Opinion respecting 
the State Prisoners in Gaol on the first of Jan. y 1778", Statement of Account, RG 1, vol. 248, doc. 
13, PANS; the former document, regrettably, is not extant. 
52 See, for example, Innis, Simeon Perkins, p. 175 (18 December 1777). 
53 Buggey, "Salter", p. 696. 
54 Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. xiv. 
55 Fischer, "Revolution without Independence", p. 101. 
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Nor was Salter the only Halifax merchant prosecuted in such a public and 
repressive manner: the New England Planter merchant, John Avery, was indicted in 
the summer of 1779 for carrying on trade, commerce and correspondence with the 
rebels. Having been arrested, imprisoned and then released after entering into a 
recognizance for £2,000, Avery was never subsequently tried on or discharged from 
the indictment which was found against him; his ordeal lasted for nearly five years. 
Despite the intervening passage of the omnibus amnesty act, the prosecution was 
continued from term to term, until April 1784, after Avery's premature death.56 As 
a brother of one of the leading Cumberland insurrectionists, James Avery, John 
Avery was placed in a hopelessly compromising position.57 
Yet John Avery did not form part of the New England quadrilateral on which 
Brebner based his "stifling of treasons" argument.58 It will not do as an effective 
reinterpretation of the Nova Scotia government's strategy for suppressing sedition 
to place on an equal footing Judge Foster Hutchinson, the Boston Tory refugee 
lawyer and mandamus councillor;59 the "seditious preacher", John Seccombe; the 
"ardent republican", Malachy Salter; and the oath-breaking conscientious objector, 
Timothy Houghton. The only thing these four New Englanders had in common was 
that they were all natives of Massachusetts and that they were suspected of 
disloyalty chiefly on account of their New England connections. Of the four, only 
Salter and Houghton were indicted and tried, and only against Houghton was an 
unconditional verdict of guilty of high misdemeanour recorded. That the 
government's overreaction to the crisis was reflected in the political use of the 
criminal law against New Englanders of any stripe, whether old settlers or recent 
refugee immigrants, suggests that, while the nature and degree of official repression 
could vary widely, its most characteristic form was legal. Moreover, by effectively 
banning treason trials, the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act narrowed the range of 
prosecutorial options available to colonial governments for suppressing rebellion 
and apprehending insurrection. A renewable war measures act designed to legalize 
56 Pleas of the Crown, RG 39, series J (HX), vol. 1, pp. 348, 405; Crown Prosecutions, RG 1, vol. 
342, docs. 51-7, PANS. See Norton, New England Planters, p. 33, §267. 
57 A Connecticut Yankee whose family included prominent and active patriots such as his younger 
brother James, John Avery struggled unsuccessfully for the rest of his life to remove the stigma of 
the presumption of guilt by association which had attached itself to him. The literature on Avery is 
considerable: Ernest A. Clarke, "Cumberland Planters and the Aftermath of the Attack on Fort 
Cumberland", in Margaret Conrad, ed., They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime 
Canada (Fredericton, 1988), p. 44; Jean Stephenson, "The Connecticut Settlement of Nova Scotia 
Prior to the Revolution", National Genealogical Society Quarterly, 42, 2 (June 1954), p. 59; Julian 
Gwyn, "Capitalists, Merchants and Manufacturers in Early Nova Scotia, 1769-1791: The Tangled 
Affairs of John Avery, James Creighton, John Albro and Joseph Fairbanks", in Margaret Conrad, 
ed., Intimate Relations: Family and Community in Planter Nova Scotia, 1759-1800 (Fredericton, 
1995), pp. 190-212. See also Nova Scotia Gazette & Weekly Chronicle (Halifax), 25 November 
1783, p. 1. 
58 Brebner, Neutral Yankees, p. xiv. 
59 Judge Hutchinson (younger brother of the last royal governor of Massachusetts Bay) arrived in 
Halifax in April 1776, and promptly arranged for inflammatory Congressional documents to be 
printed in the Gazette: ibid., p. 340. 
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detention without trial on suspicion of high treason, it had the unanticipated side 
effect of limiting the scope of prosecutable crimes against the state to sedition. The 
latter was a utilitarian common-law misdemeanour comprehending a wide range of 
indictable offences from defamation to constructive high treason. Prosecutions for 
ancillary or collateral crimes against the state also served the limited monitory and 
exemplary purpose of legal repression better than statutory high treason, which 
posed serious political risks for the legitimacy, impartiality and credibility of the 
administration of criminal justice by colonial governments. Grand juries were less 
likely to find 'true bill' on high treason indictments, and petit juries less likely to 
convict for a crime for which the death penalty was mandatory and royal pardons 
unheard-of. Sedition, on the other hand, was a first-division misdemeanour, which 
might comprehend "treasonable and seditious words, libels or correspondence" — 
to quote the language of Nova Scotia's "Act of Grace", the omnibus State Crimes 
Pardon Act of 1783.60 Unlike high treason, these crimes and misdemeanours 
against government were — in theory, at least — prosecutable by means of the ex 
officio criminal information as well as by regular indictment. 
Even from indictments, however, if the prosecution was ordered by government 
during wartime, the only release was by death — as both Salter and John Avery 
discovered. It is therefore necessary to view the sedition proceedings — the most 
obvious method of dealing with rebel sympathizers — as but another of several 
aspects of the government's broad strategy of legal repression. A willingness to 
invoke the heavy hand of state security law also marked the Nova Scotia 
government's reaction to several other instances of real or imagined sedition during 
this period. Though none of these involved armed rebellion, the government's 
persecution of the expatriate New England merchants, Salter and Avery, shows that 
the official response to crimes against the state — less high treason, where the 
government's freedom of action was severely curtailed by imperial legislation, than 
sedition, where the limitless resources of the common law might be exploited fully 
— was heavy-handed legal repression. Parson Seccombe was not merely warned 
and asked to renounce republicanism; "he was ordered to find security in £500 for 
his good behaviour, and to be debarred from preaching until he had signed a 
recantation".61 Timothy Houghton was tried and convicted of high misdemeanour 
for slandering the king and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. The charge against 
Malachy Salter was not dropped, despite the lieutenant-governor's stay-of-
proceedings order, and he remained under indictment until finally discharged by 
death three years later. 
The behaviour of the Nova Scotia government with regard to suppressing 
60 Statutes of Nova Scotia (1783) 23 Geo. 3, c. 3: "An ACT for granting the King's Most Gracious 
Free Pardon, to all His Subjects in this Province, for all Treasons, Misprison of Treasons, or 
Treasonable Correspondence committed or done by them, or any of them, in adhering to, aiding or 
assisting, countenancing or abetting, His Majesty's late Subjects in the Thirteen Colonies, during 
their Rebellion". The second section enacted that all depending prosecutions, whether private or 
public, should cease. Such an act could not have been passed unless and until the overriding Habeas 
Corpus Suspension Act expired for good, which it did in January 1783. 
61 Murdoch, Nova-Scotia, p. 584. 
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rebellion and sedition during the Revolutionary years was not consistent, thanks to 
the interposition of the imperial Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Deprived of high 
treason as a triable crime against the state, the government focused maximum 
attention on sedition. In doing so, it consistently tended to exaggerate and to 
overreact to the apparent danger to state security posed by the New England 
'underground'. The government, moreover, was prepared to use this temporary act 
as a cloak for subverting due process of law in the attempt to counter incitement to 
rebellion. Inevitably, political protest was criminalized. The authorities dealt 
vigorously with the Cumberland insurrection in late 1776, but though the siege of 
the fort had been lifted and the rebels dispersed or captured, the following and 
succeeding years were marked by an expanded strategy of legal repression, which 
from late 1776 onwards included prosecutions for sedition. The significance of 
Salter and the other sedition proceedings is precisely that dissent was "depicted as 
treason".62 The policy of indiscriminate repression directed towards New 
Englanders, Planter and non-Planter alike, though perhaps a policy dictated to 
some extent by post-insurrection paranoia, was nonetheless one which treated true 
sedition — breach of allegiance — as constructive high treason. The aftermath of 
the Cumberland insurrection suggests that the government dealt leniently with 
treason and repressively with sedition in order not to have occasion to suppress 
rebellion again. The renewable, and five times renewed Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Act was flexible enough to permit the government either to inflict wholesale legal 
repression or to alternate repression and leniency. 
If the ordeal of Malachy Salter provides a contribution to the historiography of 
political crime in 18th-century Nova Scotia, it also suggests the need for some 
modification of the Clarke-Phillips thesis, which extrapolates official restraint from 
a loyalty paradigm for the popular response to the American Revolution in Nova 
Scotia. Explanations of why Nova Scotia did not rebel, or was not invaded like 
Quebec — the real 'fourteenth colony'63 — have stressed ideological over material 
factors and religious attitudes over practical economic, military and even 
epidemiological considerations (smallpox). Historians of the political economy of 
the American Revolution, such as Joseph Ernst, make the instructive point that 
Nova Scotia did not have the infrastructure to rebel even if it had wanted to: 
"What Nova Scotia missed...was not any dialogue over liberty, or the rise of 
nationalist sentiment, but a half-century or more of economic and political 
development, and of population growth, that created the pre-conditions for 
Revolution".64 Economics and demographics aside, the New England Planter 
62 Clarke and Phillips, "Rebellion and Repression", p. 201. 
63 See, for example, S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 ([1959] 
Toronto, 1978), pp. 75ff., 'The Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony', 1775; cf. "The fact that Nova 
Scotia was only one of fourteen colonies suggests that our line of approach ought to be by way of a 
comparison between conditions in Nova Scotia and those in the other colonies, especially in those 
which were more backward in accepting the revolutionary point of view [e.g., Georgia]": Kerr, 
"Merchants of Nova Scotia", p. 21. 
64 Joseph A. Ernst, "English Canada and the American Revolution", La Révolution américaine et 
l'Europe (Paris, 1979), p. 518; see also Marc Egnal and Joseph A. Ernst, "An Economie 
70 Acadiensis 
experience in ''a marginal colony during the Revolutionary years" argues that 
historians should pay more attention to the varying degrees of «onloyalty which the 
New England majority in general exhibited, not only in the "critical years", 1775 
and 1776, but, indeed, throughout the war.65 The planter majority — 75 per cent of 
Nova Scotia's approximately 20,000 population in 1775 was of New England 
origin66 — was neither neutral nor loyal; neither was it disloyal. The New 
Englanders, like the nonjuring Acadians before them, simply wanted to be left 
alone in undisturbed possession of the status quo, anomalous and unsustainable 
though it was in the face of rebellion, civil war and revolution. The neutral 
Yankees' third way was not sincere or straightforward but time-serving and 
dissimulative — and the hard-pressed Nova Scotia government called their bluff. 
This article suggests that, in formulating its response to sedition, the oligarchy 
came to view the elite leadership of the New England church and community as 
constructive traitors. 
Finally, if there is one main conclusion which may be drawn from this 
investigation of the ordeal of Malachy Salter, it is that historians who ignore or 
undervalue the role of the old New England mercantile elite in any study of Nova 
Scotia and the American Revolution do so at their peril. Halifax, as a minor 
metropolis, was by no means unique in its dependence upon trade. 67 The English or 
English-connected merchants who survived and even flourished during the war were 
the competitors-creditors of those New England merchants victimized as political 
criminals. The only way to understand the 'treason of the merchants' is to return 
once again to studying political dissent and protest and the impact of wartime 
conditions (e.g., privateering) on commercial competition. The fate of established 
American merchants as chosen victims of state crimes prosecution in Halifax 
during the Revolutionary years cannot be satisfactorily explained by the 'leniency' 
thesis. It is time to acknowledge the centrality of government repression, and of an 
official attitude of repressiveness, to an understanding of Nova Scotia in 1775-6 — 
when revolution was not so much "rejected" as prevented. 
Interpretation of the American Revolution", William and Mary Quarterly, [3rd ser.], 29, 1 (January 
1972), pp. 3-32; and Joseph Ernst, "'Ideology' and an Economic Interpretation of the Revolution", 
in Alfred F. Young, ed., The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American 
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65 "Mr. Eaton declares positively that there was no reluctance on the part of the people 'to throw in 
their lot with their friends of the New England colonies' and ascribes their failure in so doing to 
their rural situation, paucity in numbers, dispersion in settlement, and lack of arms": Kerr, 
"Merchants of Nova Scotia", pp. 20-1, quoting Arthur Wentworth Hamilton Eaton, whose 
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